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Uk Hwang *1
This paper investigates the controversial relationship between 
labour standards and globalisation within a 2×2 Heckscher- 
Ohlin-Mayer political-economy trade model. We adopt the median 
voter model to characterise the labour standards chosen under 
majority voting. We found that labour standards are more lax in 
economies with large income inequalities. More importantly, we 
also show that globalisation may or may not promote stricter 
labour standards depending on the factor abundance of each 
country. Thus, a race to the bottom is not an necessary 
implication of globalisation.
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I. Introduction
The interaction between trade and the enforcement of labour 
standards has caused a controversy that is often linked to the 
process of rapid globalisation. The conventional view is that intense 
international competition escalates the pressures on cost cutting, 
including labour costs, for the achievement of more flexibility in the 
production processes. These pressures may lead to demands for 
laxer labour standards. For instance, the increasing mobility of 
capital, a result of globalisation, puts downwards pressure on 
labour standards and alter aspects of industrial relations, in which 
the bargaining power of employers relative to government and 
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workers is increased. The reason for this is that governments often 
attach greater importance to attracting foreign direct investment, 
and therefore may prefer lax labour standards. Thus, one could 
argue that, in an age of globalisation, labour standards are being 
weakened due to the competition between countries, and this could 
provoke a so called ‘Race to the Bottom' in labour standards for the 
global community. A detailed inspection of the relation between 
labour standards and globalisation will advance our understanding 
of these complex issues.
In this study, we aim to contribute to the theoretical literature 
on this fundamental issue. Specifically, the main objective is to 
design a model that can directly show the interaction between 
labour standards and globalisation. We begin with the two 
sector-two factor neoclassical trade model to determine the role of 
labour standards in production and the contentious issues linking 
international trade with labour standards.
This paper will study labour standards which regulate the 
allocation of labour input in production, in the sense that they may 
prevent for example child labour, forced prison labour, and 
exploitative working hours. Labour standards mostly stem from a 
concern for basic human rights and the quality of working 
environments. Therefore, labour standards in the present context 
may be interpreted as regulations that are targeted at the exclusion 
of those labour practices that are undesirable due to humanitarian 
concerns. This implies that the standards embrace public good 
attributes in themselves. Thus, once implemented, the labour 
standards, in the explicit form of laws or regulations governing the 
labour market, can share the following properties of collective 
consumption: Non-excludability and non-rivalry.1 A political or social 
consensus may be needed for the legislation of the labour 
standards in a society. Hence, a political procedure, such as 
majority voting, is one possible mechanism for making decisions on 
the provision of the labour standards.
However, from an economic viewpoint, labour standards may be 
classified as being distortionary in that they directly restrict a 
firm's demand for labour inputs, raising the cost of production, and 
1
In contrast, the private good type standards include safety and health 
rights to improve hazardous conditions in the workplace and are more 
closely related with the issue of worker's productivity.
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shifting back its labour demand curve. Thus, in a small open 
economy, the benefits of the stringent labour standards accrue only 
at the cost of lower wages and reduced production levels.2 A 
worker, as a voter, takes these relative costs and benefits into 
consideration when the labour standard is voted on.
The major questions to be addressed in this paper can be 
summarised as follows: 1) How is the legislation of labour standards 
related to the economic condition of a country?; 2) what are the 
effects of imposing labour standards on international trade?; 3) how 
does globalisation affect the choice of the labour standard?; and 4) 
can the findings for questions 1), 2), and 3) be observed empirically 
or not?
There have only been a few theoretical studies on these questions 
- for instance, Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (1996). Based on the 
standard 2×2 Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model, they analysed the effects 
of labour standards on economic welfare. They showed that, 
depending on the type of model assumed, the resulting implications 
of imposing a standard would differ. The theoretical connection 
between labour standards and trade liberalisation has been 
examined by Casella (1996). On the assumption that it is income 
differences that drive differences in labour standards, they consider 
if openness to trade makes global convergence in labour standards 
possible in two different trade models. First, in the H-O model, in 
which skilled and unskilled labour are used as production factors, 
perfect convergence occurs only if the two countries have identical 
factor intensities. Second, in the Ricardian model in which trade is 
due to technological differences, it is shown that convergence is 
possible only when the small economy has a less efficient 
technology than its large trade partner.
Our study is different from these studies in that our model 
assumes: 1) Trade between small open economies with given 
international prices; 2) the labour standards under consideration 
are either labour market regulations or industrial law, while the 
standards in previous studies were resource using when 
implemented; and 3) a political process for the provision of the 
labour standards in that we narrow down our attention to the 
public good nature of the labour standards, which are therefore 
2 Higher prices could be an additional cost borne by the consumer of a 
large open economy.
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subject to the socioeconomic environment of a society.
The basic framework for the characterisation of the equilibrium 
labour standard in this study owes much to the work of Mayer 
(1984). He uses the median voter theorem to explain the tariff 
decision mechanism in a conventional 2×2 H-O model. The 
literature of endogenous labour standards by use of the median 
voter theorem can be found in the following papers and they all 
discuss the effects of globalisation on the labour policy.
The work by Gabszewicz and Ypersele (1996) is close to our 
analysis in that they considers the political decision process of 
minimum wage policy (a form of social protection) under autarky 
using the median voter model. With a simple one sector trade 
model and the assumption of homogeneous countries (in terms of 
factor endowment and technology), they showed that the minimum 
wage policy deteriorates under international capital mobility. The 
intuition behind this is that the minimum wage policy affects the 
changes in the rental rate and so policy makers compete to attract 
the foreign capital by unilaterally lowering the minimum wage. 
Following Gabszewicz and Ypersele (1996), Boccard, Ypersele, and 
Wunsch (2003) recently presented an elaborated result on the 
minimum wage within a two sector framework with skilled and 
unskilled labour inputs. They formalised the equilibrium minimum 
wage setting as a non-cooperative game between the voters of the 
relevant countries and showed that trade will put a downward 
pressure on the level of the minimum wage due to international 
spillover in the minimum wage setting.3  Both papers predict the 
downward convergence of the specific labour standard (minimum 
wage) through capital mobility (Gabszewicz and Ypersele 1996) and 
trade liberalisation (Boccard, Ypersele, and Wunsch 2003). Dutt and 
Mitra (2002) provide empirical evidence which is consistent with the 
predictions made by Mayer (1984) concerning the median voter 
model.
Contrary to above models, our paper examines the relationship 
between labour standards of a public good nature and technology 
driven globalisation. We use the decline in transport costs, due to 
advances in modern transport technology, as an indicator of 
3
In addition, Hefeker and Wunner (2002) analyse the relation between 
the demand for labour standards and globalisation within the framework of 
interest group politics.
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globalisation (the death of distance).4
More specifically, we adopt Samuelson's (1954) iceberg transport 
cost in order to explain the effects of globalisation on the 
equilibrium labour standards. We find the followings: 1) The labour 
standards are positively related to the income equality of a society 
in the distribution of capital endowments; 2) globalisation is 
modelled as a decline in transport costs. It is shown that the 
labour standards could diverge according to the factor abundance 
of a country; and 3) free international capital mobility either leads 
countries with a lower rental rate to actively seek for the higher 
rental rates of the other countries or leads countries with a higher 
rental rate to attract foreign direct investments. These features 
consequently put diverged pressure upon the median voter's 
decision on the labour standard of each country, which is the 
similar consequence of the technology driven globalisation case. 
Thus, the changes in the labour standard implied both by the 
decrease in transport costs and by free international capital 
movement predict the existence of the different equilibrium labour 
standards in the world.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II 
discusses the distortionary impacts of the labour standard on 
production through simple comparative statics. Section III presents 
a median voter model that allows us to determine the labour 
standard endogenously. In section IV, the relationship between the 
labour standard and globalisation is examined through 1) a 
reduction in the (iceberg) type transport costs and 2) through 
changes in international capital mobility. Section V concludes the 
paper with suggestions for further research.
II. The Impact of Labour Standards on Production
Can labour standards cause distortions of production? We focus 
on labour standards that restrict the firms' labour demand, but at 
the same time deliver higher utility to workers.5 Examples include 
4
A recent dramatic reduction in communication costs along with a price 
reduction in relevant equipment could be another representative indicator of 
globalisation.
5 According to the standard analysis, the model assumes homogeneous 
labour, implying each worker has identical productivity.
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banning exploitative labour such as child or prison labour and 
restrictions on the length of the working day. This study interprets 
the imposition of labour standards as technical de-progress in a 
standard two sector framework.
We consider a 2×2 H-O model of a small open economy.6 The 
country produces two goods Q1 and Q2 using a constant returns 
technology and employing labour (L) and capital (K). Good 1 is 
capital intensive while good 2 is labour intensive. We consider both 
the case where the country is endowed with relatively large 
quantities of labour (the case of a labour abundant country) and 
the case where the country is endowed with relative large 
quantities of capital (the case of a capital abundant county).
A. Sector Specific Impacts of the Labour Standard θ i＝θ i(s)
The labour standards are denoted as s∈[0, s ̅].7 The regulatory 
impact on the production of the capital intensive good (good 1) is 
generally denoted θ1(s) and the impact on the production of the 
labour intensive good (good 2) is θ2(s). The labour standards reduce 
the effective labour input such that if the firms in sector i demand 
L i then the effective labour input is θ i L i. We assume that the 
regulatory impact of the standard is given by
θ i(s)→1  as  s→0
θ i(s)→0  as  s→s ̅
Moreover, we assume that dθ i (s)/ds≤0, d2θ i (s)/ds2≤0 and 0＜θ i(s)＜1 
for i＝1, 2 and ∀s∈[0, s ̅].8 Finally, we also assume that the impact 
of the labour standard is larger in sector 2 (the labour intensive 
6
It is initially assumed that world trade is opened according to 
differences in the factor endowments between countries as the 
Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) theorem predicts. Later the case, in which one of the 
crucial assumptions that the factors are not internationally mobile is 
relaxed, will be discussed for further implication of the labour standards.
7
We may arbitrarily define a maximum level of the labour standard as
s ̅ (≪∞).
8
0＜θ i(s)＜1 suggests that the standards will be imposed to keep the 
production level strictly positive. This implicitly indicates that the production 
functions require strictly positive input levels so as to keep strictly positive 
production levels. Thus the conditions we assumed for the production 
fuctions in the model are Q1＝F(0, K1)＝0 and Q2＝G(0, K2)＝0 when an 
extreme case of labour standards is imposed.
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sector) than in the capital intensive sector 1, i.e.,
θ2(s)≤θ1(s)                           (1)
|θ ’2|≥|θ ’1|
where θ ’i＝dθ i/ds. This assumption says that implementing the 
standards is more costly for the labour intensive industry than for 
the capital intensive industry.
B. The Impact on Production and Factor Rewards
Each industry employs a standard linear homogeneous pro-
duction function with constant returns to scale using labour and 
capital as inputs. The production functions can be expressed in 
intensive form as function of the factor intensity (ki＝Ki/Li, i＝1, 2), 
where k1＞k2.
Q1＝F(K1, θ1L1)＝θ1L1 f(θ1－1k1)                   (2)
Q2＝G(K2, θ2L2)＝θ2L2 g(θ2－1k1)
Hence, the industry producing good 2 uses a labour intensive 
technology while the industry producing good 1 uses a capital 
intensive technology. Under perfect competition, a factor's reward is 
the value of its marginal product, and it is equal across sectors 
due to the assumption that the production factors are mobile 
between industries within the country.
We now turn to how the level of the labour standard is 
determined by political competition. Due to its impact on factor 
demands, imposing a stricter labour standard may cause social 
conflict because individuals with a larger capital endowment benefit 
from the increasing rental rate, while those who derive most of 
their income from labour lose out because of the decrease in the 
wage. This trade off is resolved in the political arena as discussed 
in the next section.
III. Endogenous Labour Standards
We consider a 2×2 Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson general equilibrium 
trade model of a small open economy. The economy is endowed 
with given quantities of intersectorally mobile capital and labour. 
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For a clear presentation of the mechanism for endogenous labour 
standards, explicit forms of technology and preference are adopted 
in this section.9
The labour standard is regarded as a public good, such as for 
example common rules or regulations through which a society 
achieves a public goal (see Casella (1996)), but at the same time 
the standard increases the cost of production (as in Hefeker and 
Wunner (2002)). Before we look at the determination of the labour 
standard in political equilibrium, we briefly consider producer and 
consumer choices in the economy.
A. The Firm's Cost Minimisation Problem
Taking factor prices as given, firms employ labour and capital so 
as to maximise profits. The regulatory impact of the labour 
standard is assumed to be common to both sectors with
θ (s)＝(1－s)γ
where s∈(0, 1) is the standard.10 The term (1－s)γ, which regulates 
the labour input, reduces the effective amount of labour L i(1－s)
γ in 
each sector below the potential L i.
We assume that the production technology is of the Cobb- 
Douglas type and write
Q1＝Θ1K11－α {L1(1－s)γ}α                     (3)
Q2＝Θ2K21－β{L2(1－s)γ}β
9 As previously discussed, the labour standards are the types which 
generate some distortionary effect on the production process by regulating 
labour demand on one side, but increase the utility of workers by 
protecting and improving either working conditions or the employee's rights 
in the working place on the other. Thus, the national labour standards in 
this model could be classified as a labour market regulation or a labour 
related mandated industrial law.
10
The regulatory impact is assumed to be a nonlinear function of the 
labour standards so that the wage rate does not quickly decline when 
higher labour standards are imposed. The common regulatory impact (θ1＝θ2
＝θ 3) to each sector is considered for a clear presentation of the model. As 
will be shown, only the wage rate is the function of the labour standard 
when the common regulatory impact is applied specially in the 
Cobb-Douglas type production functions. This distinctively makes the 
indirect utility function of an individual (voter), who lives on the factor 
income, globally concave (single-peaked).
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where α and β are labour income share and α＜ β and 0＜α , β, γ＜1 
are assumed. Furthermore, Θ1＝α－α(1－α)－(1－α ) and Θ2＝β－β(1－β )－(1－β ) 
are assumed.
Notice that it is more costly in terms of the foregone production 
to impose the labour standards on a labour intensive industry. 
Since firms are assumed to operate under perfect competition, 
they earn zero profits in equilibrium and factor demands are given 
by standard marginal productivity conditions. Then, the firm's profit 
maximisation problem says
maxπi＝piQi－ci(w, r, s)Qi
where i＝1, 2 and ci(w, r, s) is the unit cost function which 
determines the cost of producing one unit of i good at given factor 
prices and for a given labour standard.
At equilibrium, the price of each good is equal to the unit cost 
such that
1＝c1(w, r, s)＝r
1－αwα (1－s)－αγ                   (4)
p＝c2(w, r, s)＝r
1－βwβ (1－s)－βγ
Here, the capital intensive good 1 is assumed to be the numeraire. 
So the price of good 2 (p＝p2/p1) is expressed in terms of the price 
of good 1. Since we focus on a small open economy, p is given at 
the world markets for goods. Shepherd's Lemma implies that the 
units of capital and labour required to produce one unit of good i 
are ∂ci(w, r, s)/∂r(＝aKi) and ∂ci(w, r, s)/∂w(＝aLi), respectively. Thus, 
the conditions for full factor employment can be expressed as
∂c1 (w, r, s)
Q1＋
∂c2 (w, r, s)
Q2＝K  (5)
∂r ∂r
∂c1 (w, r, s)
Q1＋
∂c2 (w, r, s)
Q2＝L  
∂w ∂w
where K and L are the endowments of capital and labour, 
respectively.
From the cost functions in Eq.(4), the factor prices are 
determined as follows11







We note that the higher the labour standard is, the lower the wage 
rate (∂w/∂s<0) is. On the other hand, the return to capital is 
unaffected by the labour standard. This is because the impact of 
the standard is the same in each sector and enters as technological 
de-progress in the Cobb-Douglas production function. Note that a 
stricter labour standard increases the relative price of capital (r/w).
B. Preference
As for the direct utility function, the separable log linear form for 






j)1－δ＋sg                     (7)




where C is a constant which is equal to (δδ(1－δ )1－δ )－1, and the 
parameters δ and g are between 0 and 1 (0＜δ, g＜1). Qi
j
 denotes 
the demand for good i by individual j.
As discussed above, the labour standard is like a public good in 
that no individual is excluded from the benefits it generates. Notice 
that we assume that the standard enters additively in the utility 
function and that there is diminishing returns to the “strictness” of 
the standard. The individual's factor income is equal to
yj(s)＝w(s)Lj＋rKj＝w (s)＋rKj                  (8)
Each individual is assumed to be endowed with one unit (Lj＝1) 
of labour, whereas the capital endowment is assumed to be 
11
With general production function forms specifying the different 
regulatory impacts of the labour standard (θ1＞θ2) upon each sector, it can 
be shown that the rental rate is an increasing function of the labour 
standard such that dr(s)/ds＞ 0. However, with the specific labour 
augmenting form (θ＝(1－s)γ), which is commonly applied to the production 
function in (3), we are able to pay sole attention to the regulated labour 
market for simplicity of our analysis.
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unequally distributed among the individuals in the economy. Thus, 
the heterogeneity among individuals derives from an unequal 
distribution of the capital endowment. As shown in Alesina and 
Rodrik (1994), each individual can be indexed by her relative 
capital endowment σ j, which is defined as
σ j＝(Kj/K)(Lj/L), σ j∈[0, ∞)
This implies that an individual with a high σ j is capital-rich, while 
one with a low σ j is capital-poor. Hence, the individual's factor 
income can be written as
yj＝w＋rσ jk, k＝K/L                       (9)
where k is the average capital endowment per capita in the 
economy.
Solving the consumer's optimisation problem for given prices and 
labour standard, we can derive the indirect utility function:
Vj(p, yj, s)＝(δ－1)lnp＋lnyj＋sg                (10)
The indirect utility function represents the individual's policy 
preference and is referred to as “the policy preference function of 
individual j.”
C. Trade Patterns
Next, we consider the relationship between international trade 
and the labour standards. In the model, two possible motives for 
trade are possible: 1) Capital/labour endowments may differ across 
countries as the standard H-O model predicts; and 2) the level of 
the labour standard may differ across countries. By describing the 
relative demand and supply of good 1, we will illustrate the effects 
of differences in factor endowments and the impacts of the labour 
standard on the pattern of trade when an economy moves from 
autarky to free trade.
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where the demand is independent of income. Since each country 
has an identical preference structure, the relative demand of the 
world is given by the same expression.













where k is the capital intensity of the economy and Q̅i denotes the 
potential output level of good i.13 Hence, the relative net supply 
consists of two parts; the potential relative supply (Q ̅1/Q ̅2), which 
depends on the relative factor endowment and a factor that 
indicates the portion of lost production due to the enforcement of 
the labour standard (1－s)
(α－β )γ. So, the term (1－s)(α－β )γ may be 
interpreted as the cost of meeting the standard in terms of lost 
output. If s＝0, then the actual relative supply would be equal to 
the potential relative supply. Since our model assumes that sector 
1 is capital intensive (α ＜β ), the relative supply of good 1 is 
increasing in s.14
Differences in the level of the labour standard can determine the 
12 From the simultaneous Equation (5), the aggregate supply of each good 












Q ̅2 k(∂c ̅1/∂w)－(∂c ̅1/∂r)
where c ̅i(w, r) is a unit cost function to produce one unit of the good i with 
no labour standard enforced.
c ̅1 (w, r)＝r1－α wα and c ̅2＝r1－β wβ
14 If the model assumes that sector 1 is labour intensive (α＞β ), then the 
relative supply of good 1 would be decreasing in the labour standard s.
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trade pattern. For simplicity, suppose that the world consists of 
many small open economies and that the factor endowment ratio of 
each country is the same. Then, 1) there would be no trade 
between the countries when each country imposes an identical level 
of the labour standard, 2) a country exports the capital intensive 
goods when it implements the labour standard which is relatively 
stricter than the labour standards of the rest of the world, and 3) 
a country exports the labour intensive goods when it implements a 
relatively laxer labour standard than the labour standards of the 
rest of the world.
In contrast, if labour standards are identical across countries, 
then trade is driven by the difference in factor endowments as in 
the standard H-O theory of trade.15
D. The Labour Standard under Majority Voting
This study assumes that the equilibrium labour standard in a 
country is determined by a political process such as voting. 
Specifically, the labour standard is the result of majority voting (see 
Mayer (1984)). We assume that votes reflect the economic interests 
of those who are eligible to vote and that voting is sincere.
An equilibrium level of the labour standard is defined as one 
whereby no majority of voters can be formed to alter that level. 
According to the median voter theorem, if individual voters' policy 
preference are single peaked and the policy space is one- 
dimensional, there exists a condorcet winner, i.e., an alternative 
that cannot be beaten by any other alternative in a pair-wise 
majority vote. It is assumed that each individual factor owner j can 
vote and that the capital endowment is unevenly distributed, 
ranging from individuals with no capital endowment, σ jk＝0, to 
individuals with the maximum capital endowment, Kj
max＝σ jmaxk. We 
assume that the economy is inhabited by a continuum of people 
and we normalise the size of the population to 1. Moreover, we 
assume σ j is distributed according to a probability density function 
ξ (∙) with mean σ and median σ m . Hence, ∫zξ (σ j(z))dz＝1 and z is 
an index which maps 0≤z≤1 to 0≤σ j(z)≤σmax. The mean of σ j(＝σ ) 
accordingly defined as
15 This can be immediately shown by differentiating (11) with regard to K 
and L respectively.
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σ＝∫z σ j(z)ξ (σ j(z))dz
The individual's indirect utility function can be written as
Vj＝(p, τ, σ j, s)＝(δ－1)lnp＋ln(w(s)＋rσjk)＋sg






















The negative second order condition confirms the single peakedness 
of the utility function (global concavity of the policy preference 
function). Therefore, it can be deduced that the optimal level of 
labour standard (s*j) for individual j’ is determined at the point 
where the marginal cost is equal to the marginal benefit when 
there is one unit increase in the standard. More specifically, from 
the first order condition in (12), the direction of the change in the 


















－2 rk{γw(s)} ＞ 0 (15)
∂σ j∂s 1－s
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Therefore, we note that ds*j/dσ j ＞ 0. The sign indicates that an 
individual who is relatively well endowed with capital prefers a 
higher labour standard. This is because the loss of factor income 
due to a higher labour standard is relatively minor to individuals 
who are well endowed with capital as compared to those who are 
poorly endowed with capital.
With a continuum of individuals, single peaked preference, and 
one dimensional policy space, the preference of the median voter 
determines the equilibrium policy, which is unique (see Persson 
and Tabellini (2000, ch. 2)), s*＝s*(σ j). Thus, under majority voting, 
the equilibrium labour standard established is the individual 
optimal labour standard for the median voter s(σ m ). This is 
because s(σ j) is increasing in σ j, the median bliss point corres-
ponds to the bliss point of the median value of σ j (＝σ m ). The 
equilibrium labour standard therefore depends on the character-
istics of the median voter and the actual distribution of the capital 
endowment of the economy. Notice that the social optimal level of 
the labour standards solves the following programme;
max∫z {(δ－1)lnp＋ln (w(s)＋rσ jk)＋sg}ξ (∙)dz
    s
It is clear that the socially optimal labour standard is a function 
of σ , s＝s (σ ), i.e., it depends on the mean capital endowment, σ . 
We can summarise the predictions regarding the equilibrium labour 
standard as follows.
Proposition 1
Depending on the distribution of capital endowment in a society, 
the following features of the median voter equilibrium are predicted: 
(1) If all individuals are endowed with equal amounts of capital
(σ j＝σ＝σ m ), then the equilibrium labour standard is equal to the 
social optimal labour standard (e.g. an egalitarian or socialist 
country); (2) if the distribution of relative capital endowments is 
right skewed as is commonly observed in the real-world, then the 
political equilibrium of the labour standard is lower than the one 
preferred by the voter with average capital endowment; and (3) if 
the distribution of relative capital endowments is left skewed, then 
the political equilibrium of the labour standard is higher than the 
one preferred by the voter with average capital endowment.
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The most realistic case is case (2) where the labour standard in 
political equilibrium is lower than the socially optimal one s(σ ). 
This is because, in real world distributions, the capital/labour ratio 
(σ m ) for the median individual m relative to the overall capital/ 
labour endowment for the economy is less than the average ratio 
(σ ) for all countries (see Alesina and Rodrik (1994)). Thus it is  
s(σ )＞ s(σ m ) due to ds*j/dσ j ＞ 0.
The equilibrium level of the labour standard may diverge among 
countries depending on differences in the political or economic 
condition of a country, even though the countries are endowed with 
identical amounts of capital and labour. Below we shall investigate 
how the equilibrium labour standard is affected by the process of 
globalisation.
IV. Globalisation and Labour Standards
The effects of globalisation on the equilibrium level of the labour 
standard is examined in the following. Globalisation is defined as 
the closer integration of the world economy through trade, and we 
focus on the decline in transport costs as one of its main causes.16 
Although there are several key features pertaining to globalisation, 
we will address the following questions;
1. How does globalisation geared by the transport revolution 
affect the labour standards adopted by individual countries?
2. Given the frequent movement of capital across borders and the 
reduction in labour migration in recent times, what are the 
implications for the equilibrium labour standard of increasing 
capital mobility?
A. The Transport Revolution: The Iceberg Model
The transport cost is modelled according to the “iceberg” model 
introduced by Samuelson (1954). That is, for every unit shipped 
internationally, only 1/τ units reach the export market, where τ＞1. 
In a small economy, the transport cost has similar economic effects 
as a tariff on the effective price of imported goods and an export 
tax on exports, but the fundamental difference is that there is no 
16 For detailed discussion of the nature of globalisation, see George and 
Wilding (2002).
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revenue generated. The import of the product market prices faced 
by firms in the two sector depends on the trade patterns before the 
introduction of the transport costs. The followings present this 
implication.
First, suppose that a country is labour abundant and that 
determines trade patterns. Then the labour intensive good is 
exported and the capital intensive good is imported. The exporters 
can sell at the price p at the world market. However, for cost that 
the good is delivered to the world market, additional 1/τ units 
must be produced so the effective price faced by an export firm 
producing for the world market is p/τ. Competition between firms 
producing labour intensive good to serve the domestic market also 
brings the price faced by all firms down to p/τ. Likewise, import 
good can be bought at the price 1 at the world market. However, 
for each unit sold in the domestic market, additional τ units must 
be imported. This allows domestic purchase of capital intensive 
good to increase the price to τ.
Second, suppose that a country is capital abundant and that 
determines trade patterns. Then the capital intensive good is 
exported and the labour intensive good is imported. Though the 
exporters can sell the good at the price 1 at the world market, they 
have to produce additional 1/τ units for each unit exported 
considering the transport costs. This leads the exporters to be faced 
with the effective price 1/τ. The firms which serves the domestic 
market will also competitively charge 1/τ. The labour intensive good 
is bought at the price p at the world market. Since importers have 
to buy additional τ units for each unit to be sold in the domestic 
market, the price rises up to τp. The firms producing the labour 
intensive good to serve in the domestic market also charge τp for 
their profits maximisation.
Next, we investigate how the fall in the transport cost 
(globalisation) affects changes in the labour standard of a small 
open economy according to the two cases discussed above.
a) Case 1: A Capital Intensive Good Exporting Country
Let us first consider the case in which a country exports capital 
intensive goods. Then, the profit maximisation problem of the firm 
producing capital intensive goods for export with transport costs, τ 
is
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π1(Q1)＝τ－1Q1－c1(w, r, s)Q1
Thus, the unit cost function is equal to
 τ－1＝r1－αwα(1－s)－αγ                     (16)
On the other hand, the profit maximisation problem of firms 
producing labour intensive goods is
π2(Q2)＝pτ Q2－c2(w, r, s)Q2
And the unit cost function is
pτ＝r1－βwβ(1－s)－βγ                      (17)
From the unit cost functions (16) and (17) in which the transport 











A change in the transport cost affects the factor prices as follows
∂r/∂τ＜0, ∂w/∂τ＞0                    (19)
That is, the effective price of the labour intensive good faced by 
import firms increases with the transport cost, while the price faced 
by exporters fall. This raises the wage since this is the factor 
extensively used in the domestic production of the import good, 
while the return to capital decreases. This is because producers of 
labour intensive goods, motivated by an increase in the price they 
face produce more, whereas domestic producers of the capital 
intensive good, who face a lower price reduces production and 
thus, the demand for capital. Hence, the result indicates that the 
effects of the transport cost, which results in a change in the 
effective relative prices faced by importers and exporters, induce 
changes in the factor prices according to the predictions of the 
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Stolper-Samuelson theorem (1941).
Next, the effects of transport costs (globalisation) on the labour 
standard in political equilibrium are analysed. With transport costs, 
the policy preference function (10) can be expressed as
Vj(p, τ, yj, s)＝(δ－1)lnp＋(2δ－1)lnτ＋lnyj＋sg          (20)
where yj＝w(τ, s)＋σ j r(τ )k.
Using the same procedure as in section III-D, we can 
characterise the political equilibrium as the choice of the median 
voter of a capital rich country:
s*m＝s*(σ m , τ )
where the choice of the labour standard now depends on the 
transport cost and s*m is the solution to 
 y m
－1{－γw(τ, s)/(1－s)}＋gsg－1＝0               (21)
We want to determine the sign of ds*m/dτ to see how 
globalisation affects the median voter's choice of the labour 





















where w’＝∂w/∂τ  and r’＝∂r/∂τ . This can be further rewritten as















∂τ ∂τ w ym2(1－s)




where ε (ym )(＝(∂ym/∂τ )(τ/ym )) and ε (w)(＝(∂w/∂τ )(τ/w)) are the 
transport cost elasticity of factor income and the wage rate, 
respectively. This calculation allows us to determine the sign of   
∂
2V{m}/∂τ∂s. The second term is obviously positive while the first 
term can be simplified to yield





Since 0＜α, β＜1, the sign of the ε (ym )－ε (w) term is clearly 
negative.17 Therefore, the overall sign of ds*m/dτ is negative, 
meaning that the transport cost is negatively related to the 
equilibrium labour standards in a capital rich country. Surprisingly, 
higher equilibrium labour standard is adopted in response to lower 
transportation cost. Thus, globalisation needs not (for countries 
that export capital intensive goods) reduce labour standards.
The intuition is as follows. From the first order condition (21), 
the labour standard is determined in the point where the marginal 
benefit with the stricter standard is equal to the marginal cost 
owing to the factor income loss. It is also noticed that an increase 
in the transport cost is accompanied by a fall in the price of the 
factor (the rental price in this case) which is abundant in that 
country. Thus, the factor income loss of the median voter of a 
capital abundant country is relatively larger than that of the 
median voter of a labour abundant country when the transport cost 
increases. In this case, the median voter would like to compensate 
17 The clear-cut positive sign of (14) and negative of (22) are based on our 
assumptions of the model; the Cobb-Douglas type production functions, the 
log-linear indirect utility function, and the sector common labour standards. 
Hence, it will not be easy to obtain clear signs with other forms of the 
assumptions of the fundamentals of the economy.
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his relative income loss by choosing the lax labour standard. This 
is because the changes in the relative factor price due to the 
standard has opposite direction to the changes due to the transport 
cost. An identical logic is applied to explain the changes in the 
labour standard affected by a fall in the transport cost in a labour 
abundant country.
b) Case 2: A Labour Intensive Good Exporting Country
Consider a labour abundant country that exports the labour 
intensive good 2 and imports the capital intensive good 1. The 
profit maximisation problem of producer of the capital intensive 
good is
max π1(Q1)＝τ Q1－c1(w, r, s)Q1
and the problem faced by the producers of the labour intensive 
good is
max π2(Q2)＝pτ－1Q2－c2(w, r, s)Q2
The unit cost functions are 
τ＝r1－αwα (1－s)－αγ
for the sector 1 and
pτ－1＝r1－βwβ (1－s)－βγ
for the sector 2 respectively. The wage and rental rate can be 










A change in the transport cost affects the wage and rental rate as 
follows
∂r/∂τ＞ 0, ∂w/∂τ＜ 0
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The result is exactly opposite to the case of a capital intensive 
goods exporting country. This is because the price increase in 
capital intensive goods, caused by the transport cost, motivates 
firms to increase production, giving the capital owner higher rents. 
However, faced with a lower export price for labour intensive goods, 
the firms in that industry can pay lower wages to workers. Again, 
this is just an application of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.
Globalisation changes the labour standards in the opposite 
direction to those in capital intensive good exporting country case. 
To find the sign of ds*/dτ, we need to find the sign of ∂2Vj/∂τ∂s. 
As before, it will suffice to find the sign of {ε (yj)－ε (w)} as in (24), 






Thus, the result predicts that the labour standard in labour rich 
countries would decline as the world market becomes better 
integrated. The iceberg transport cost model suggests quite 
surprising results in two factor-two sector H-O political trade model 
for the labour standards.
Proposition 2 
Suppose that iceberg transport costs are introduced in the 2×2 
H-O trade model with endogenous labour standards. Then, 
globalisation (τ⇓) is accompanied by increasing labour standards
(s⇑) in capital abundant countries and by decreasing labour 
standards (s⇓) in labour abundant countries.
This happens in this model through the relative increase in the 
export goods price, and in the income share of the factor which is 
intensively used in exporting goods production. The proposition 
implies a possibility that the divergent labour standards between 
countries. The foregoing findings on the relation between the labour 
standards and globalisation will be empirically examined to check 
whether they are supported by the data or not.
B. International Capital Movement
The standard H-O model assumes that production factors are 
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immobile across borders. The trade occurs only due to the unequal 
distribution of the production factor endowments between the 
countries. In order to highlight the relationship between capital 
mobility and the labour standards, conventional trade policy tools, 
such as tariff and taxes to import or export, are ignored, as are 
transport costs.
As we have assumed through the paper, we keep the small open 
economy assumption for the analysis of changes in the labour 
standards under international capital mobility. The world consists 
of many small countries and each single country, when it changes 
its domestic labour standard level, generates a negligible effect on 
the changes in the capital/labour ratio of the rest of world, and 
thus on the international rental rate which is determined in the 
international capital market.
The following briefly discusses how the equilibrium labour 
standard is related to international capital movement.18 Suppose 
that, before the international free capital movement is allowed, the 
relative capital endowment (σ m ) of the median voter in each 
country is assumed to differ across countries. This assumption 
leads to the legislated level of the labour standards being unequal 
across countries.19 Then, the factor prices also differ internationally 
due to (15). Thus, the key determinant of capital flow in this model 
is the initial differences in the labour standards between countries. 
To explicitly show this argument, we generalise the assumption of 
the production functions specified in (3) as follows;
Q1＝Θ1K11－α {L1(1－s)α }α                    (25)
Q2＝Θ2K21－β {L2(1－s)β }β
That is, we generalise the impact term of the labour standard in 
each sector such that θ1(s)＝(1－s)α, θ2(s)＝(1－s)β and α ＜ β so that 
they satisfy the assumption of (1). Then the factor prices are 
represented as functions of the labour standard such that
18
Recently there have been many countries that generally welcomed 
foreign direct investment (inflow of capital) but fear immigration and strictly 
restrict it.
19
If the labour standards across the countries are identical, the factor 
price equalisation theorem, one of core theorem of the H-O model, will be 
hold in our framework (see, Samuelson (1949)).
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r(s)＝p
α





This shows that ∂r(s)/∂s＞ 0 and ∂w(s)/∂s＜ 0. It is assumed that 
countries are incompletely specialised in the production of the two 
goods before free capital movement. Thus, the differences in the 
labour standards can explain the differences in the factor prices 
across the countries. 
Then, by allowing international capital movement, world capital 
will freely move from countries with a low rental rate to countries 
with a high rental rate.20 Free movement of capital leads to rental 
rate equalisation and the direction of capital flow of a country 
depends on the sign of difference between the initial rental rate of 
that country and the international rental rate. In the presence of 
capital flow, the corresponding change in the relative factor price 
ratio in terms of the rental rate equalisation affects individual's 
factor income. Then, it will also affect the median voter's preference 
on the labour standard in the sense that the factor prices depend 
on the labour standard.
The following analysis examines how the equilibrium labour 
standard in a particular country changes after international capital 
movement is allowed in the model. Since countries either import or 
export capital in accordance with the sign of difference in rental 
rates, we study, in turn, the case of a capital importing and a 
capital exporting country.
a) Case 1: Capital Importers
Suppose that the relative capital endowment of the median voter 
in country A is larger than capital holdings of median voters of the 
rest of the world (represented by W). That is, if σ mA > σ mW, then the 
equilibrium labour standard in country A would be stricter than 
the labour standards of the rest of the world; sA > s
W due to 
ds*m/dσ m > 0. The differences in the factor prices caused by 
non-uniform labour standards provide incentives for capital to 
migrate away from low reward countries to high reward country
(W⇒A) when capital moves freely across borders. This is the case 
20
Labour is only mobile between sectors.
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in which imposing a stricter labour standard attracts foreign 
capital. Capital inflow would continue until the return to capital is 
equalised across countries. The total amount of capital employed in 
production in country A is increased to KA＝KA＋κ, where KA stands 
for the initial amount of capital endowment of country A and k 
denotes the amount of capital inflow from abroad. Accordingly, as a 
result of international capital movements, the rental rate of country 
A (＝rA) is lowered and pegged at the international level (＝r
W). It is 
observed that the amount of capital inflow (k) is negatively related 
to the changes in the rental rate in country A.
Given the relative commodity price p and the initial labour 
standard, capital inflow and resulting change in the factor 
proportion will induce a change in the relative production of each 
sector. But the small open economy assumption requires that the 
factor proportion of each sector must be retained in the initial level 
before capital import. Therefore, with capital inflow, reduction in 
the production of good 2 and increase in the production of 1 are 
needed to satisfy this condition in country A. Capital inflow will 
continue until the production of good 2 reaches none.21 Thus, 
country A becomes specialised in the production of capital intensive 
good 1 when it initially has the stricter labour standard than the 
rest of the world and attracts internationally mobile capital.22
The capital inflow determines the new optimal capital-labour ratio 
(KA＋κ )/LA for the production of good 1, which depends on the 








See McGuire (1982) for further details of the process of specialisation 
in production. A similar situation is studied in his study when he examined 
the effect of unilateral imposition of environmental regulation in the face of 
international capital movement.
22
Bhagwati et al. (1998) discusses the question of whether a standard 
2×2 model would exhibit incomplete specialisation in the face of free capital 
movements and international differences in technology and reviews the 
related literature (see Jones (1967), Inada and Kemp (1970), Chipman 
(1971), Uekawa (1972), and Wong (1983)). Here, we follow the approach 
adopted by McGuire (1982), in which complete specialisation happens in 
response to free capital movement.
^
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Since good 2 is no longer produced in country A, the factor prices 









The changes in the wage rate concerning the changes in the 










This says that, as the amount of capital inflow increases, the wage 
rate also rises. Intuition behind this is that the marginal 
productivity of labour input increases with the given level of labour 
endowment when the inflow of foreign capital to country A is 
gradually increased.
We then analyse the effects of international capital mobility on 
the labour standard in political equilibrium. The policy preference 
function (10) of an individual j in country A can be expressed as
Vj(p, yj, sA)＝(δ－1)lnp＋lnyj＋sgA                (27)
where yj＝w(r
W, sA )＋σ j rWk.
Like the procedure in section III-D, we can characterise the 
political equilibrium labour standard (s*A) as the choice of the 
median voter of country A in face of foreign capital inflow;
s*A＝s*A (σAm , rW)
where the equilibrium level of the labour standard now depends on 





＝0        (28)
To see how international capital mobility affects the median 
voter's choice of the labour standard, we examine the sign of 
ds*A/dr
W. The sign of ds*A/dr
W is obtained by using the implicit 
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which is clearly negative. Then, the sign of ds*A/dr
W can be decided 
upon the sign of ∂
2Vm/∂r





－1 α { 1－α wA (1－ wA )＋ wAσ A
m k
}＞0
∂rW∂sA (1－sA) α rW ym ym
Hence, ds*A/dr
W is positive and suggests that the equilibrium labour 
standard decreases as capital increasingly migrates from abroad. 
The implication of the result is as follows; as the foreign capital 
flows into the domestic capital market, there are pressures for 
lowering the domestic rental rate. This is because the domestic 
capital competes with the foreign capital that tries to capture the 
higher domestic rental rate in the market. Also, the marginal 
productivity of labour increases in accordance with the capital 
inflow. Then demands for 1) raising wage rate and 2) lowering 
rental rate would grow. Thus, the median voter of the capital 
import country would like to minimise her loss in factor income by 
choosing the laxer labour standard, which results in the higher 
wage rate and the rental rate equalised to the international level. 
This is why the median voter prefers the lowered labour standard 
in the face of capital inflow.
b) Case 2: Capital Exporters
Changes in the equilibrium labour standard of a capital export 
country (say, country B) is our next concern. In contrast to the 
capital import country case, we consider the case in which the 
relative capital endowment of the median voter in country B is 
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smaller than capital holdings of median voters of the rest of the 
world. That is, if σ Bm< σ Wm , then the equilibrium labour standard in 
country B would be laxer than the labour standards of the rest of 
the world; sB < s
W due to ds*m/dσ m > 0. Thus the rental rate (rB) of 
country B is lower than the international rental rate (r
W). Hence, 
the domestic capital migrates to the foreign countries because of 
imposing a laxer labour standard. Capital outflow would continue 
until the return to capital is equalised to the international level. 
The total amount of capital used in each sector is decreased; 
KB＝KB－κ, where KB stands for the initial amount of capital 
endowment of country B and k denotes the amount of capital 
export to foreign countries. As a result of international capital 
movements, rental rate of country B is raised to the international 
level (rB＝r
W). The lower the rental rate relative to rW is, the greater 
the amount of exported capital (k) is. Capital outflow could lead 
country B to the complete specialisation in the production of the 









The changes in the wage rate with regard to the changes in the 










This means that, as the amount of capital outflow increases, the 
wage rate decreases. This is because the marginal productivity of 
labour input decreases when the capital migrates away to foreign 
countries for capturing higher the international rental rate.
We next analyse the effects of international capital movement on 
the equilibrium labour standard of a capital export country. The 
policy preference function (10) of an individual j in country B can 
be expressed as
Vj(p, yj, sB )＝(δ－1)lnp＋lnyj＋s
g
B                (31)
^
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where yj＝w(r
W, sB )＋σ j rWk.
The political equilibrium labour standard (s*B ) is the choice of the 
median voter of country B in face of foreign capital outflow:
s*B＝s*B (σ Bm , rW )
where the equilibrium labour standard is a function of the 
international rental rate. Thus the equilibrium labour standard (s*B ) 





＝0       (32)
To see how international capital mobility affects the median voter's 
choice of the labour standard in country B, we look for the sign of 
ds*B/dr










The second order condition with regard to sB is negative as in (30). 
The sign of ds*B/dr
W depends on the sign of ∂2Vm/∂r
W∂sB. From 
the first order condition in (32),
∂2Vm
＝ym
－1 β { 1－β wB (1－ wB )＋ wBσ B
m k
}＞0
∂rW∂sB (1－sB) β rW ym ym
The positive sign of ds*B/dr
W indicates that the equilibrium labour 
standard increases as more capital migrates to abroad. The 
implication of the result is as follows; as capital outflow continues, 
the marginal productivity of immobile labour declines and the 
demand for the higher rental rate from the capital holders who 
allocate their capital to the domestic production would grow. This 
is because, unless the domestic rental rate is equalised to the 
international level, all the capital of country B would fly away. 
Then faced with the growing demands for lower wage rate and 
higher domestic rental rate, the median voter in country B is 
motivated to minimise her loss in factor income by choosing the 
stricter labour standard, which exactly raises the rental rate and 
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lowers the wage rate. Thus, the median voter in country B would 
more be inclined toward choosing higher labour standard when 
capital migrates away.
We have so far examined the changes in the labour standard of 
a small open economy in consideration of the cases for 1) capital 
import country (A) and 2) export country (B). Our model predicts 
that the stricter labour standard attracts internationally mobile 
capital while the laxer labour standard induces the domestic capital 
to flow out due to the differences in the domestic and international 
rental rates. It is noted that the changes in the labour standard as 
a result of international capital movement generate the conse-
quences that are similar to those generated by the technology 
induced globalisation examined in the previous subsection.
V. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have attempted to clarify the controversial 
relationship between labour standards and globalisation within a 
two factor-two sector Heckscher-Ohlin-Mayer political economy trade 
model. The study is restricted to a particular class of labour 
standards which regulate undesirable exploitation of labour use, 
such as excessive working hours, child labour and forced labour. 
The economic consequences of these labour practices are identical 
in the model. We use transport costs as a direct measurement of 
globalisation. The median voter theorem is adopted to characterise 
the equilibrium level of the standard. The model yields the following 
insights. First, the introduction of the labour standards generates 
distortions of factor prices and the production, and can even 
determine the trade pattern of a country by influencing its 
comparative advantage. Second, the political equilibrium labour 
standard is negatively associated with a society's inequality in the 
distribution of capital endowments. Third, and most importantly, 
the equilibrium labour standard is either positively or negatively 
associated with globalisation (by a fall in transportation costs) 
depending on the factor abundance of a country. This suggests that 
there exists divergent directions of change in the labour standards 
in the global economy. Globalisation resulted from increasing 
international capital movement also leads to either laxer or stricter 
labour standards across countries, implying that an overall trend 
towards a race to the bottom between countries is not the 
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consequence of globalisation. This is because a median voter with 
relatively greater amount of capital than median voters of the rest 
of the world would suffer loss in the rental income when capital 
moves in. This is caused by the stricter labour standard initially 
set before free capital movement. Thus the median voter would 
prefer the lower labour standard to compensate the loss in factor 
income after capital inflow. A median voter with relatively lower 
capital endowment than median voters of the rest of the world 
would behave exactly opposite way.
These results are based on restricted assumptions including an 
inelastic labour supply and full employment. Some argue that 
recent unemployment problems, particularly in the developed 
countries, may be ascribed to the increase of imports produced by 
the cheaper labour of other developing countries. Further studies 
on the issue could incorporate this view into the current analysis. 
Moreover, the following suggestions for the possible developments in 
the paper would be of interest in future research: 1) the major 
findings presented in this theoretical model need to be justified by 
empirical evidence and 2) acknowledging that the dominant form of 
polity in the most modern states follows party representative 
democracy system, the episode of labour standard policy may be 
better explained by adopting the probabilistic voting theory to the 
original model rather than by majority voting, which is only 
relevant in the countries such as Switzerland where important 
national affairs are often decided through direct democracy. 
(Received 28 June 2006; Revised 23 August 2006)
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